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LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT AND THE
SOUTH CAROLINA EXPERIENCE
I. INTRODUCTION
The number of state agencies has risen sharply in recent
years, resulting in a corresponding increase in the number of
agency rules and regulations.1 California, for example, had 72
agencies which filed 456 regulations during fiscal year 1967-68.
2
During the 1978-79 fiscal year, 147 California agencies filed al-
most 1200 regulations.3 In 1980, South Carolina's agencies4 sub-
mitted 73 sets of regulations.5 This figure rose to 88 in 1981.1
On January 26, 1982, President Ronald Reagan proposed
turning over responsibility for more than forty federal programs
to the states.7 Should this proposal become effective, it will un-
doubtedly add to the proliferation of agency rules and
regulations.
Legislatures have responded to the growth of agencies and
rulemaking by adopting some form of "legislative oversight."8
1. For purposes of this paper, the words "rule" and "regulation" will be used inter-
changeably. According to the 1961 version of the Model State Administrative Procedure
Act, "'rule' means each agency statement of general applicability that implements, inter-
prets, or prescribes law or policy, or describes the organization, procedure, or practice
requirements of any agency.... ." MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 1(7), 14
U.L.A. 357, 372 (1961)(amended 1980) [hereinafter cited as 1961 MODEL STATE APA].
The South Carolina Code contains a more detailed definition and uses the term "regula-
tion" instead of "rule." S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-10(4)(Supp. 1981). The Federal Adminis-
trative Act [hereinafter cited as Federal APA] uses the term "rule." 5 U.S.C. §
551(4)(1970 & Supp. V 1975).
2. Starr, California's New Office of Administrative Law and Other Amendments to
the California APA: A Bureau to Curb Bureaucracy and Judicial Review, Too, 32 An. L.
REv. 713 (1980).
3. Id.
4. South Carolina has eighty-six state agencies. S.C. CODE ANN. R.1-1 to R.125-12
(1976 & Supp. 1981).
5. 4 S.C. State Reg. (1980).
6. 5 S.C. State Reg. (1981).
7. The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 27, 1982, at 3, col. 1.
8. Although "legislative oversight" seems to indicate the legislature overlooked regu-
lations, the phrase actually refers to a process of overseeing the regulations. Under this
process, the agency must submit rules promulgated by it to the state legislature for ap-
proval or disapproval. F. COOPER, STATE ADMImSrATIvE LAW 221 (1965).
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The most common types of legislative oversight are one or more
of the following: simple review of the regulation with only advi-
sory comment;' repeal of a regulation by resolution;10 suspension
of the regulation by a legislative committee until the full legisla-
ture acts;"' or permanent suspension of the regulation by a legis-
lative committee unless reversed by the full legislature. 12 The re-
peal by the legislature of a regulation is known as a "legislative
veto." In 1955 only six states provided for review of agency
regulations.1' Today, thirty-eight states, including South Caro-
lina, have some type of legislative review procedure.1 5
The purpose of this article is to present an overview of the
development of legislative oversight, and to compare South Car-
olina's oversight statute16 with other state oversight statutes and
the Model State Administrative Procedure Act (1981 Model
State APA). South Carolina's oversight statute will then be
considered in depth, focusing on its weaknesses and the consti-
tutionality of the statute.
II. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT
A. Development in Great Britain
Parliament began to control delegated or subordinate legis-
lation (i.e., administrative rules and regulations) during the
nineteenth century.18 Beginning in 1833, Parliament required
9. See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 107-17 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
13. At the federal level, enabling statutes provide for the legislative veto. This al-
lows Congress or a congressional subgroup to control implementation of agency action.
The approval can be by either negative or positive action. The most common control is
negative action, which provides that, in the absence of disapproval, the rule becomes
effective after a specified period. Positive control requires congressional approval before
the rule can go into effect. Dixon, The Congressional Veto and Separation of Powers:
The Executive on a Leash?, 56 N.C.L. REV. 423, 426 n.14 (1978).
14. Schwartz, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution-A Reexamination, 46
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 351, 362 (1978).
15. ALA. CODE § 42-22-22 commentary (Supp. 1981).
16. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-23-120 to -140 (Supp. 1981).
17. MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT §§ 3-201 to -204, 14 U.L.A. 74 (Supp.
1982)[hereinafter cited as 1981 MODEL STATE APA]. The 1961 version does not provide
for legislative oversight. See supra note 1.
18. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 359.
[Vol. 34
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rules of court procedure to be "laid before" it for a specified pe-
riod before the rules would take effect.19 What is substantially
the modern version of oversight developed in 1875 when this
procedure was extended to all types of subordinate legislation.20
Parliamentary control over subordinate legislation is pres-
ently asserted through provisions in enabling statutes,21 rather
than by a general statute requiring all instruments to be brought
before Parliament.22 Great Britain has two types of over-
sight-"affirmative" and "negative.
'23
Affirmative oversight procedure requires, through an ena-
bling statute, that the statutory instrument be approved by res-
olution of both houses or of the House of Commons alone.24 The
enabling statute may allow the statutory instruments to take im-
mediate effect, but requires an affirmative resolution for contin-
ued validity.25 This affirmative procedure is considered the more
powerful of the two and is usually used when "matters of princi-
pal are delegated. '26 This is typically when either taxes or a levy
is imposed, or when the enabling statute defines legislative pol-
icy in broad terms, deriving its actual content from the statutory
instrument.21
An enabling statute negative oversight procedure requires
statutory instruments to be laid before Parliament for forty
days, during which any single member of the House of Commons
19. Carr, Legislative Control of Administrative Rules and Regulations: II. Parlia-
mentary Supervision in Britain, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1045 (1955).
20. This was in the Judicature Act of 1875, 38 & 39 Vict. c. 77 § 25, which also fused
common law and equity. Carr, supra note 19, at 1046. After 1948, subordinate legislation
was referred to as "statutory instruments." Carr, supra note 19, at 1046.
21. Schwartz, Legislative Control of Administrative Rules and Regulations: I. The
American Experience, 30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1031, 1032 (1955).
22. Sir Carr suggests that more than half of the yearly statutory instruments do not
have an oversight requirement. Carr, supra note 19, at 1048.
23. Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1032-33; Carr, supra note 19, at 1047; F. Cooper,
supra note 8, at 223.
24. Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1032-33.
25. F. Cooper, supra note 8, at 223.
26. Carr, supra note 19, at 1047.
27. Id.; F. Cooper, supra note 8, at 223. In 1924, the House of Lords established a
Special Orders Committee to examine and report upon all instruments requiring affirma-
tive approval. In 1944, the House of Commons established a standing committee, the
Scrutiny Committee. These committees report any unexpected use of statutory power to
the respective houses. Carr, supra note 19, at 1049-50. Since its establishment, the Scru-
tiny Committee has increased substantially the efficiency in the House of Commons.
Schwartz, supra note 14, at 361.
1982] 597
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may enter a motion, referred to as a "prayer," to annul the in-
strument. The motion must be approved by members of the
House to effect the annulment. As a result, many instruments
take effect without challenge.2 s
B. Oversight in the United States at the Federal Level
1. Development
In 1941 the United States Attorney General's Committee on
Administrative Procedure rejected the use of the British proce-
dure in this country. The Committee reported that "[legislative
review of administrative regulations, . has not been effective
where tried."2 9 In 1946 Congress adopted the Federal Adminis-
trative Procedures Act. The Act did not provide for direct con-
gressional review of agency rulemaking,30 and the current ver-
sion does not contain such a provision. During 1976, the
Administrative Rule Making Reform Act, 1 which would have re-
quired a systematic review of rules,32 was introduced, but failed
to receive the required two-thirds vote. s
While Congress has thus far rejected a general oversight re-
quirement, it has, in particular statutes, implemented legislative
oversight similar to the British "negative" oversight procedure.'
The first statute to provide for a legislative veto was the Legisla-
tive Appropriation Act of 1932,35 passed when President Hoover
sought to reorganize executive departments and agencies of the
federal government. Hoover was required to submit his propos-
28. Carr, supra note 19, at 1047.
29. Schwartz, supra note at 14, at 359-60 (citing ATr'v GENERAL'S COMM. ON ADMIN.
PROCEDURE, REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. Doc. 8,
77th Cong., 1st Sess. 120 (1941)).
30. See Admin. Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946)(current version at 5
U.S.C. § 553 (1970 & Supp. V. 1975)).
31. H.R. 12,048, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4, 122 CONG. REc. H 10666-90, H 10718-19
(1976).
32. The agency submits the rule to the Secretary of the Senate and Clerk of the
House. Unless it is disapproved within ninety days of submission by a concurrent resolu-
tion of both houses, or within sixty days by a resolution of one house, the rule becomes
effective. If disapproved by a resolution of one only house, the remaining house has
thirty days beyond the sixty day limit to reject the other house's resolution. Id.
33. Id.
34. Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1036. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
35. Pub. L. No. 72-212, 47 Stat. 414 (1932).
598 [Vol. 34
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als to Congress as a check on the broad powers granted the Pres-
ident under the Act. The proposals were to be adopted if neither
house passed a resolution of disapproval, known as a one-house
veto.36
Since 1932, more than 295 legislative vetoes have been in-
serted in over 196 acts of Congress.37 In addition to the one-
house veto required in the Legislative Appropriation Act, Con-
gress has required in various statutes that before a rule can take
effect it must not have been vetoed by both houses of Con-
gress," by a congressional committee,3 9 or by a single committee
chairman. 0
2. Alternative Methods of Legislative Oversight Not
Employing the Veto
The discussion of legislative oversight at the federal level
thus far has focused on oversight that included a legislative veto.
Congress employs other methods of oversight as well. The most
fundamental, direct, and effective method is for Congress to re-
voke an offending rule by enacting a statute that explicitly re-
scinds or preempts the rule.4 1 Another statutory method is to
alter the jurisdiction of the agency 2 or limit its authorizations
and appropriations.43 There is also a growing number of statu-
tory techniques that have an indirect influence on oversight.
These include prior review requirements and "notice to Con-
gress" provisions."
36. Miller & Knapp, The Congressional Veto: Preserving the Constitutional Frame-
work, 52 IND. L.J. 367, 372 (1977). Presidents, from Hoover to Carter, have attacked the
legislative veto on Constitutional grounds. See W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS,
ADMimISTRATm LAW CASES & COMMENTS 119 n.3 (7th ed. 1979).
37. Miller & Knapp, supra note 36, at 371.
38. E.g., Motor Vehicle and School Bus Safety Amendments of 1974, 15 U.S.C. §
14106(d)(1)(1976).
39. E.g., Dep't of Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94165, tit. II, 89 Stat. 977, 993-94 (1975).
40. E.g., Supplemental Appropriation Act for 1953, Pub. L. No. 82-547, § 1413, 66
Stat. 637, 661 (1952).
41. For examples see Kaiser, Congressional Action to Overturn Agency Rules: Al-
ternatives to the "Legislative Veto," 32 AD. L. REv. 667, 670-73 (1980).
42. Id. at 673-87.
43. Id. at 687-96.
44. Id. at 696-704. A number of nonstatutory controls also exist. Although these
controls are neither self-enforcing nor legally binding, they contribute substantially to
1982] 599
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3. Review of the Legislative Veto by the Federal Courts
In Sibbach v. Wilson,4 the authority of Congress to dele-
gate the development of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
the United States Supreme Court was upheld. A provision of the
enabling act' 6 required submission of the rules to Congress prior
to their effective date. This provision allowed Congress to disap-
prove a rule or rules if found contrary to the enabling legislation.
The Supreme Court reasoned that: "The value of the reservation
of the power to examine proposed rules, laws and regulations
before they become effective is well understood by Congress. It
is frequently, as here, employed to make sure that the action
under the delegation squares with the Congressional purpose.
'47
Although Sibbach is the leading judicial expression on the legis-
lative veto, it dealt only with the power of Congress to veto new
rules of court procedure."8
In Buckley v. Valeo,49 the Supreme Court was asked to de-
termine the constitutionality of a provision of the Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act5" providing that the rules of the Federal
Election Commission (FEC) could be disapproved by resolution
of either house within thirty days after the rules were submitted
to Congress. 1 The Court did not reach the merits of this issue,
but instead found the manner of appointment of FEC members
unconstitutional, thus precluding the Commission from exercis-
ing its rulemaking powers.5 2 Justice White, concurring in part
rulemaking control. The nonstatutory oversight techniques include: legislative investiga-
tion and confirmation hearings, select agency rulemaking committees, directives in com-
mittee reports, congressional criticism of agency action, and liaison between a congres-
sional office and an agency. These alternative methods are clearly within the power of
Congress and do not impinge on the powers of other branches. Id. at 668.
45. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
46. 28 U.S.C. §§ 723b, 723c (recodified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1948)).
47. 312 U.S. at 15.
48. See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
49. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
50. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (Supp. V 1975).
51. Id. at § 438(c).
52. 424 U.S. at 140. The Court in reference to the legislative veto said:
Appellants make a separate attack on this qualification of the Commis-
sion's rulemaking authority, which is but the most recent episode in a long tug
of war between the Executive and Legislative Branches of the Federal Govern-
ment respecting the permissible extent of legislative involvement in rulemak-
ing under statutes which have already been enacted .... Because of our hold-
ing... we have no occasion to address this separate challenge of appellants.
[Vol. 34
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol34/iss2/7
LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT
and dissenting in part, addressed the merits of the constitutional
issue:
I am also of the view that the otherwise valid regulatory
power of a properly created independent agency is not ren-
dered constitutionally infirm, as violative of the President's
veto power, by a statutory provision subjecting agency regula-
tions to disapproval by either House of Congress. For a bill to
become law it must pass both Houses and he signed by the
President or be passed over his veto .... [Flor a regulation to
become effective, neither House need approve it, pass it, or
take any action at all with respect to it. The regulation be-
comes effective by nonaction. This no more invades the Presi-
dent's powers than does a regulation not required to be laid
before Congress. Congressional influence over the substantive
content of agency regulation may be enhanced, but I would not
view the power of either House to disapprove as equivalent to
legislation or to an order, resolution, or vote requiring the con-
currence of both Houses.
5
3
After Buckley, Congress amended the Federal Election
Campaign Act to provide for a constitutionally valid appoint-
ment procedure." Congress did not, however, change the legisla-
tive oversight or veto provisions. The constitutionality of these
provisions was challenged in a subsequent suit, Clark v. Valeo.55
In Clark, the government, on behalf of the President and the
executive branch, was granted permission by the district court to
intervene, apparently for the purpose of also challenging the
veto provision. The questions presented were certified by the
district court to the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit, which held that "the matter before us
does not present a ripe 'case or controversy' within the meaning
of Article III [of the Constitution]. ' 56 The court of appeals dis-
missed the case and the Supreme Court affirmed without an
opinion.
57
Although the merits of Clark were never reached, Judge
Id. at 240.
53. Id. at 284-85 (White, J., concurring & dissenting).
54. 2 U.S.C.A. § 437c(a)(1)(West Cum. Supp. 1977).
55. 559 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.. 1977), aff'd mem. sub noma. Clark v. Kimmitt, 431 U.S.
950 (1977).
56. 559 F.2d at 647.
57. Clark v. Kimmitt, 431 U.S. 950 (1977).
1982]
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MacKinnon's dissent in the court of appeals decision directly
addressed the constitutionality of the veto provision.5" Judge
MacKinnon distinguished the "lay-over provision" of Sibbach
from the "lay-over" and one-house veto provisions found in the
Federal Election Campaign Act, concluding that: "[a lay-over
provision] . .. can allow Congress to act in a constitutional
manner through both houses and the President .... But the
one-house veto. . is a completely different method of accom-
plishing a legislative result by a congressional procedure not au-
thorized by the Constitution . . . ."5 Judge MacKinnon as-
serted that Justice White's approach in Buckley "ignore[s] the
actual situation created in Congress"60 by the Act's legislative
veto provision.
A legislative veto provision in the Federal Salary Act of
196761 has also been challenged. The Act authorized the Presi-
dent to adjust the compensation of federal employees. The rec-
ommended salaries, however, could be vetoed by either house of
Congress. 2 In Atkins v. United States," 140 federal judges chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the Salary Act's veto provision.
The Court of Claims, in a four to three decision, upheld the veto
but limited its scope to government salaries. These salaries are
within the purview of Congress because of the "appropriations
power" 4 and the "necessary and proper"6 clauses."6 The case
was dismissed, however, because the plaintiff judges failed to
state claims entitling them to recovery.
67
The most recent federal case to consider the legislative veto
is Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service." In
58. 559 F.2d at 678-95 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 681 n.4 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 685 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
61. 2 U.S.C. § 359 (1970)(amended 1977)(current version at 2 U.S.C.A. § 359 (Supp.
1982)), The current version of the statute requires an affirmative vote by both houses
within 60 days for approval or disapproval.
62. Id.
63. 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. CI. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978). The Federal
Salary Act of 1967 also was challenged in McCorkle v. United States, 559 F.2d 1258 (4th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978), but the court did not reach the legislative
veto issue on appeal. Id. at 1262-63.
64. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
65. U.S. CoNs1T., art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
66. 556 F.2d at 1057-71.
67. Id. at 1071.
68. 634 F.2d 408 (1980).
[Vol. 34
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Chadha, a three-judge panel for the Ninth Circuit unanimously
held unconstitutional a one-house veto by the House of Repre-
sentatives of a determination by the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service (INS) that plaintiff Chadha should be allowed to
remain in the United States. Chadha, a native of Kenya, entered
the United States as a nonimmigrant student in 1966. In 1975
the executive branch of the government, acting by a special in-
quiry officer of the INS, determined that although Chadha was
subject to deportation, his deportation should be suspended be-
cause of extreme hardship. On December 16, 1975, the House of
Representatives passed a resolution to overrule the suspension
of Chadha's deportation. As a result of the House's action, the
deportation proceedings were reconvened, and a final order for
deportation was entered. Chadha then filed suit, contending the
enabling statute 9 authorizing congressional disapproval was un-
constitutional. The court requested both houses to file briefs on
this issue as amici curiae.
7 0
The Ninth Circuit rejected Congress' arguments that the
court lacked jurisdiction; that the legislative veto was not part of
the deportation proceedings, and therefore, should not be in-
volved in judicial review; that there was no case or controversy;
that Chadha lacked standing; and that the issue was political
and therefore not justiciable. 1 The court then explored general
constitutional considerations and the veto as applied to Chadha.
After a lengthy analysis of separation of powers principles, the
court found that the veto was an impingement upon the judici-
ary,7 2 on executive powers, and a departure from constitutional
lawmaking by bicameral action with presidential approval.7 3 Al-
69. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2)(1976).
70. 634 F.2d at 411.
71. Id. at 411-20.
72. Id. at 430. The court said:
We think the supervening legislative action taken here implies a radical
alteration of the role of federal courts in the field of administrative law. By
reason of the congressional disapproval device, nearly all judicial interpreta-
tions of the criteria in section 244 are rendered, in effect, impermissible advi-
sory opinions.... We think this is an interference with a central function of
the Judicary, and that it is an interference which is both disruptive and
unnecessary.
Id.
73. Id. at 432-35. On May 1, 1981, this case was appealed to the United States Su-
preme Court as Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 49 U.S.L.W. 3865
(U.S. May 19, 1981)(No. 80-1832). The Court heard oral arguments during the week of
1982] 603
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though only a one-house veto was considered in Chadha, many
of the court's positions are applicable to a congressional veto of
rulemaking and can be extended to two-house legislative veto by
concurrent resolution.
C. Oversight at the State Level
1. Development
Although the federal government has relied solely on ena-
bling statutes containing veto provisions and has not enacted a
general statutory requirement for legislative oversight, the states
have experimented with various general oversight statutes. As
Mr. Justice Brandeis said, "a single courageous state may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."7 4
The states have proven this observation correct in their develop-
ment of oversight statutes.
One of the first states to enact a statutory provision for leg-
islative oversight of administrative rules was Kansas in 1939.71
The statute allowed rules to become effective upon filing and
publishing, subject to disapproval by a concurrent resolution of
the legislature.76 Because the statute lacked a provision for rou-
tine review by the legislature, it was seldom used."
February 22, 1982, and on July 2, 1982, the Court ordered the case restored to the calen-
dar for reargument. 50 U.S.L.W. 3998 (U.S. July 2, 1982)(No. 80-1832). The appeal raises
the issues of whether the veto violates separation of powers, whether the one-house veto
provision is severable from section 244 of the Act, and whether the court of appeals had
jurisdiction. 50 U.S.L.W. 3633 (U.S. Feb. 16, 1982)(No. 80-1832). Hopefully the Supreme
Court will reach the merits of the legislative veto issue in this latest appeal.
74. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (dissenting opinion).
The differences in state constitutions also accounts for some of the variation in state
oversight statutes.
75. KAN. LAWS 1939, ch. 308c.
76. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-410 (1964).
77. F. Cooper, supra note 8, at 225 (citing Howe, Legislative Review of Administra-
tive Rules, CURRENT TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATION, 199 (1955-56)). A more recent Kan-
sas statute grants an agency rule the force and effect of law. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-425
(1977). The legislature may adopt a bill to modify, approve or reject rules and regula-
tions submitted by the agency. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-426(e) (1977). Kansas is one of the
states which has struck down the legislative veto. Kansas ex rel., Schneider v. Bennett,
219 Kan. 285, 301, 547 P.2d 786, 799 (1976) (authority of legislative members of state
finance council to approve expenditure of special revenue funds held a violation of sepa-
ration of powers).
604 [Vol. 34
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In 1945 the Michigan legislature passed a bill containing an
oversight provision employing an affirmative veto. The bill re-
quired that rules be referred to legislative committees in the
same manner as bills, and any rule not affirmatively adopted by
concurrent resolution was suspended. 8 The bill, however, was
vetoed by the Governor. 9 The legislature responded in 1947 by
enacting a statute authorizing negative oversight. Under this
statute, new rules were submitted to various legislative commit-
tees. The rules were upheld unless disapproved by concurrent
resolution. The 1947 statute also provided for a joint interim
committee to review rules until the next regular session.80 The
statute was amended in 1951 to give the interim committee even
greater power. Under the 1951 amendment, once a rule was sus-
pended, it remained suspended unless reinstated by the commit-
tee or by concurrent resolution of the legislature.81
In 1953, the Michigan Attorney General declared the over-
sight statute unconstitutional.82 The interim committee contin-
ued to operate but refrained from suspending rules. In 1958, a
statute was passed eliminating the committee's power to sus-
pend rules. The legislature, however, could still disapprove a
rule by concurrent resolution.83 The committee problem was set-
tled in 1963 when Michigan adopted a new constitution. Section
37 of article IV authorized the legislature to establish an interim
committee with the power to suspend rules until the next regu-
78. F. Cooper, supra note 8, at 226.
79. Governor Kelly stated the following as his reasons for vetoing the bilh
1. Instead of an orderly method of legislative condemnation of improper
rules and regulations, the act decrees automatic death for all rules which have
not met with legislative approval at the time of the short adjournment.
2. The legislative burden of technical detail, already excessive, would be
increased tremendously.
3. Legislative attention would be diverted from major issues of public
policy.
4. A legislative review of administrative rules, as provided in this act, is
doubtful from a constitutional viewpoint. The Attorney General of Michigan
shares my opinion in this regard.
Schuberg, Legislative Adjudication of Administrative Legislation, 7 J. PUB. L. 135, 142
(1958).
80. MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 24.71 (repealed 1970).
81. F. Cooper, supra note 8, at 226 (citing Public Acts 1951, Act No. 9).
82. Letter from Michigan Att'y Gen. Frank G. Millard to Hon. Adrian de Boom
(Dec. 17, 1953), quoted in part in Schubert, supra note 79, at 158.
83. 1958 MIcH. PuB. AcTs No. 177, § 8c.
1982] 605
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lar session.8' The present legislative veto technique was estab-
lished with passage of the Administrative Procedures Act of
1969.85 This Act allows the committee to temporarily suspend a
rule and introduce a concurrent resolution in either house to dis-
approve the rule. If the resolution is adopted, the rule does not
take effect.86
Like Michigan, Wisconsin also experienced difficulty in de-
veloping its approach to legislative oversight. In 1953, Wisconsin
adopted a statute allowing disapproval of all agency rules, in-
cluding those in existence, by joint resolution. 7 A year later, the
Wisconsin Attorney General issued an opinion finding the stat-
ute unconstitutional. The Attorney General concluded that the
joint resolution procedure violated a provision of the Wisconsin
Constitution requiring laws to be enacted by bill subject to the
governor's veto.8 8,
In 1955, the Wisconsin legislature repealed the 1953 over-
sight statute and created a joint legislative advisory committee
to review administrative rules.89 The legislature completely abol-
ished the committee eleven years later.90 The present method of
legislative oversight, adopted by statute in 1970, provides for
joint committee review of administrative rules. The committee
may suspend a rule after a public hearing, but a rule may not be
revoked except by a bill introduced in the legislature.91
2. Current Status of Oversight Legislation in the States
Thirty-eight states presently use some form of legislative
84. This section states:
The legislature may by concurrent resolution empower a joint committee
of the legislature, acting between sessions, to suspend any rule or regulation
promulgated by an administrative agency subsequent to the adjournment of
the last preceding regular legislative session. Such suspension shall continue no
longer than the end of the next regular legislative session.
MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 37.
85. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 24.201 to -.315 (1981).
86. MICH. Coup. LAWS ANN. § 24.245 (1981).
87. 1953 Wis. Laws ch. 331, § 4.
88. 43 Op. Wis. Att'y Gen. 350, 352-55 (1954)(construing Wis. CONST. art. IV, § 17;
art. V, § 10).
89. Wis. STAT. § 227.041 (1957).
90. 1965 Wis. Laws ch. 659, § 21.
91. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 13.56 (West 1972 & Supp. 1982).
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oversight.92 There are four basic categories of oversight proce-
dures: (1) review of regulations by the legislature with only advi-
sory comments authorized; (2) repeal of regulations by joint or
concurrent legislative resolution upon the recommendation of a
reviewing committee; (3) suspension of regulations for a speci-
fied period of time; and (4) permanent suspension of regulations
by a legislative committee, subject to reversal by the legisla-
ture.93 It is difficult to place some states in only one category
because the statutory requirements of the categories are similar.
For example, a state may allow the suspension of a regulation by
a committee and also allow the suspension to be upheld or re-
jected by a joint or concurrent resolution."
The first category of legislative oversight provides for review
of regulations with only advisory comment by the legislature.
The legislature cannot suspend or abrogate the rule. Arkansas,' 5
Florida," North Dakota, 7 and Texas" are among the states us-
ing this method.
The second form of legislative oversight allows for the re-
peal of a regulation by joint or concurrent legislative resolution,
usually upon the recommendation of a reviewing committee.
Georgia," Idaho, 00 Montana,10' South Carolina,10 2 and Vir-
ginia0 8 use this method. To understand this procedure, it is nec-
essary to define what is meant by a joint or concurrent resolu-
92. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECRE-
TARIES OF STATE ADMINISTRATIVE CODES AND REGISTERS COMMI=TEE, ADMINISTRATIVE
CODES AND REGISTERS 1981 STATE/FEDERAL SURVEY [hereinafter cited as 1981 SURVEY].
93. ALA. CODE § 41-22-22 commentary (Supp. 1981). See Schwartz, supra note 14, at
362-63.
94. See infra notes 103 and 111 and accompanying text.
95. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-608 to -612 (Supp. 1981).
96. FLA. STAT. § 11.60(2)(1976 & Supp. 1981).
97. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 54-35-02.5 to -02.6 (1981).
98. TEx. STAT. ANN., art. 6252-13a, § 5(g)(Vernon Supp. 1981).
99. GA. CODE ANN., § 50-13-4(f) to (g)(1982).
100. IDAHO CODE § 67-5218 (Supp. 1981).
101. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-412 (1981).
102. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-23-120 to -140 (Supp. 1980).
103. VA. CODE § 9-6.14:9 (1950 & Supp. 1981). Until recently, Alaska was also in this
category. Alaska's statute provided that "[t]he legislature, by a concurrent resolution
adopted by a vote of both houses 'could' annul a regulation of an agency or department."
ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.320 (1980). In State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769 (Alaska
1980), the Alaska Supreme Court held that the statute violated state constitutional pro-
visions defining the mechanics of legislation. Id. at 772. See infra notes 149-55 and ac-
companying text.
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tion. A resolution is generally considered an expression of
opinion by the legislature. °10 A concurrent resolution results
when one house of the legislature passes an action in the form of
a resolution and the other house concurs to more fully express
the purpose or importance of the resolution. A joint resolution,
however, has the force and effect of law if adopted by both
houses and approved by the executive.10 5
The third type of legislative oversight allows a reviewing
committee to suspend a rule for a period of time. The suspen-
sion must be ratified by the full legislature before the rule is
permanently approved. Alabama,a 6 Michigan, 10 7 Minnesota,108
South Dakota, °10 Wisconsin,1  and Virginia"" have adopted this
approach. Both Michigan and South Dakota have constitutional
provisions establishing review committees.11 2  Illinois, a new
member of this category, adopted a statute in 1980 allowing
committee suspension of a regulation.113 The statute was
adopted over the veto of the Governor, who stated the suspen-
sion or legislative veto "constitutes a serious and unwarranted
intrusion by the General Assembly and one of its committees
into areas properly reserved to the executive and judicial
104. The difference between a resolution and a law is:
[T]he former is used whenever the legislative body .passing it wishes
merely to express an opinion as to some given matter or thing and is only to
have a temporary effect on such particular thing, while by law it is intended to
permanently direct and control matters applying to persons or things in
general.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1178 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). Accord, Newport News Fire Fighters
Ass'n Local 794 v. City of Newport News, 307 F. Supp. 1113, 1115 (E.D. Va. 1969); Beck-
er v. Detroit Say. Bank, 269 Mich. 432, 257 N.W. 853 (1934); Cleveland Terminal & V.R.
Co. v. State, 85 Ohio St. 251, 294, 97 N.E. 967, 973 (1912); Hawks v. Bland, 156 Old. 48,
49, 9 P.2d 720, 721 (1932); Rowley v. City of Medford, 132 Or. 405, 414, 285 P. 1111, 1114
(1930); Scudder v. Smith, 331 Pa. 165, 170, 200 A. 601, 604 (1938); Todd v. Yelle, 7
Wash. 2d 443, 449, 110 P.2d 162, 165 (1941).
105. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1178 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
106. ALA. CODE §§ 41-22-1 to -27 (Supp. 1981).
107. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
108. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.965 (Supp. 1982).
109. S.D. COMp. LAws ANN. § 1-26-38 (1980).
110. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
111. VA. CODE § 9-6.14:9(D)(2)(Supp. 1980).
112. MICH. CONsT. art. IV, § 37; The South Dakota Constitution provides for the
establishment of an interim committee with the power, until the legislature reconvenes,
or between sessions. S.D. CONsT. art. III, § 30.
113. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127 § 5.01 (1979).
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branches of government. 1 14 Illinois previously used an advisory
committee. 115 The new statute allows the committee to suspend
a rule upon a finding that the rule constitutes a serious threat to
the public interest, safety, and welfare.11 Once the rule is sus-
pended, the committee may then introduce, in either house of
the General Assembly, a joint resolution to continue the prohibi-
tion. If the prohibition resolution is passed by both houses, the
rule does not take effect. 
1
The fourth category of legislative oversight is used by only a
few states. It authorizes permanent suspension of a rule by a
legislative committee unless the legislature reverses the commit-
tee's action. States that use this method are Connecticut,1 8 Lou-
isiana,119 and Tennessee. 20 This method, like the committee
veto at the federal level, places an enormous amount of power in
a committee.
States without some type of legislative oversight1 21 usually
follow the 1961 Model State APA, 22 which requires that the
agency file a certified copy of each rule it adopts with the Secre-
tary of State. The rule is adopted twenty days after filing unless
a later date is required by statute. In the event of an emergency,
the rule may be adopted at an earlier date. 23
California developed a unique system of executive oversight
with the adoption of Assembly Bill 1111, which established the
Office of Administrative Law (OAL) in July of 1980.124 This
agency was created in response to the tremendous growth in the
number of regulations in California. The OAL insures that the
agencies follow specified procedures and meet required stan-
114. LaMarca, Illinois' New Legislative Veto: A Strict Scrutiny of Agency
Rulemaking "With Bite," 70 ILL. B.J. 36 (1981)(citing Governor's statement accompany-
ing H.B. 2351, Sept. 15, 1980).
115. ILL. Ray. STAT. ch. 127 § 7.04 (1979).
116. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 127 § 7.06(a)(1979).
117. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 127 § 7.06(c)(1979).
118. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-170 to 4-171 (Supp. 1982).
119. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:968 (West Supp. 1981).
120. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-129 (Supp. 1981).
121. Among those states with no legislative oversight are Delaware, Indiana, Massa-
chusetts, New Mexico, New York, and Utah. 1981 Survey, supra note 92.
122. See supra note 2. The Model State APA was revised in 1981. See supra note
17.
123. 1961 Model State APA, supra note 2, § 4.
124. OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIvE LAW, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, 2 (1981-81)[hereinafter
cited as OAL Report].
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dards in developing regulations.125 The regulations must meet
standards of necessity, authority, clarity, consistency, reference,
and, if applicable, must obtain approval of the State Building
Standards Commission. 128 As a result of OAL scrutiny during its
first year, agencies submitted thirty-two percent fewer sets of
regulations and the OAL disapproved twenty-seven percent of
those submitted.
1 2 7
If a regulation fails to meet OAL standards, the OAL may
disapprove or repeal the regulation. Agencies are allowed to ap-
peal OAL decisions to the Governor. However, during the first
year of the OAL's existence only one of its decisions was
overturned.128
3. Review of State Legislative Oversight Procedures by the
State Courts
Although there has been a significant increase in legislative
oversight at the state level, there have been few challenges in the
courts. One reason for so few challenges is that nonexecutive
agency plaintiffs must establish standing in order to raise the
issue. 1 2 These plaintiffs may be reluctant'to bring an action
when faced with the possibility that the action may hinder de-
sired legislation and approval of a forthcoming budget. 13 0 Also,
the courts may view this struggle between the legislature and
executive as a political question.13'
Legislative vetos have been upheld in decisions from three
states. The leading case is Watrous v. Golden Chamber of Com-
merce, 32 in which the Colorado Supreme Court upheld a provi-
sion in a turnpike construction statute requiring that a pledge of
125. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11340 to 11445 (West. 1980).
126. CAL. GOV'T CoDE § 11349.1 (West 1979). See Starr, supra note 3.
127. OAL Report, supra note 124, at 4.
128. Id. at 3.
129. See Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administration by Congressional Resolu-
tions and Committees, 66 HARv. L. REV. 569, 609-10 (1953); Nathanson, Separation of
Powers and Administrative Law: Delegation, The Legislative Veto, and the "Indepen-
dent" Agencies, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 1064, 1093-97 (1981); Watson, Congress Steps Out: A
Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 CALF. L. REV., 983, 989-90 (1975).
130. See Dixon, supra note 13, at 445-48; Taylor, Legislative Vetoes and the Massa-
chusetts Separation of Powers Doctrine, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REW. 1, 3 (1979).
131. Watson, supra note 129, at 989-90.
132. 121 Colo. 521, 218 P.2d 498 (1950).
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funds from the state highway fund be approved by joint resolu-
tion of the Senate and House of Representatives. The court held
that the Governor's approval was not required because the
pledge was a matter relating solely to the transaction of business
of the two houses.133 In Porterie v. Grosjean,3 1 the Louisiana
Supreme Court upheld the authority of the legislature to amend
laws and regulations by concurrent resolution.1 35 In Brown v.
Heymann,3 6 a New Jersey statute permitting the legislature to
disapprove the Governor's reorganization plan by concurrent
resolution was held constitutional by the New Jersey Supreme
Court.137
More cases have struck down the legislative veto than have
upheld it. In 1978, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
considered a bill requiring each appropriation to be fully ex-
pended unless the legislature passed a resolution releasing the
executive from this requirement.3s In Massachusetts, joint reso-
lutions are not sent to the Governor. The court reasoned that:
this section [of the bill] eliminates the Governor's constitu-
tional veto power as to the subsequent "legislation." What this
part of the proposed bill attempts to do is to provide an open-
ended means of regulating the conduct of members of the exec-
utive branch according to the consensus of the Houses of the
Legislature as evidenced by resolutions enacted at unspecified
times in the future. This would violate... the Massachusetts
Constitution .... 13
133. Id. at 546, 218 P.2d at 510. Professor Schwartz, a proponent of the veto, consid-
ers the court's reasoning "so unsatisfactory as to destroy its value as a precedent."
Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1043 n.56.
134. 182 La. 298, 161 So. 871 (1935).
135. Id. at 315, 161 So. at 877.
136. 62 N.J. 1, 297 A.2d 572 (1972).
137. Id. at 11, 297 A.2d at 578.
138. 375 Mass. 827, 376 N.E.2d 1217 (1978). During the 1970s, the Massachusetts
legislature began to subject various executive acts to the legislative veto by requiring
legislative committee approval. Taylor, supra note 130, at 10. In 1976, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court held that legislative committees were not authorized to grant exceptions
to the rule that no state employee vacancies could be filled except in cases of critical
need. Opinion of the Justices to the Governor, 369 Mass. 990, 341 N.E.2d 254 (1976).
The court held that the power to grant exceptions fell within the executive power to
expend funds. Id. at 993, 341 N.E.2d at 257. In addition, the court found that even if the
granting of exceptions was a constitutional legislative power, it would be a nondelegable
power of appropriation, which would be subject to the Governor's veto. Id. at 994, 341
N.E.2d at 257.
139. 375 Mass. at 838, 376 N.E.2d at 1223. The Massachusetts Constitution requires
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The constitutionality of the legislative veto applied to a re-
organization statute was considered in New Hampshire in
1950.140 The reorganization statute directed the Governor to
submit agency changes to the legislature for approval or disap-
proval. This portion of the statute was upheld as constitu-
tional.141 However, the portion stating that the reorganization
would become law by inaction during twenty-five legislative days
after receipt unless rejected by concurrent resolution or upon
earlier adjournment, was held unconstitutional. 142 The New
Hampshire Supreme Court found that this portion of the statute
violated the constitutional provision requiring separate action by
each house,1 43 reasoning that:
the act would dispense with the "passage" of any measure, as
the word is commonly used, and with the requirement of pres-
entation to the Governor. In a sense the act provides for a re-
versal of the democratic processes required by the Constitu-
tion, for under it the Governor would propose the legislative
action, rather than approve or disapprove action taken. 144
In 1970, the New Hampshire Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of a statute requiring approval of requests for
salary increases by the fiscal committee of the General Assembly
prior to submission to the Governor and Council.1 45 The court
held that no unconstitutional delegation of power was involved.
The statute "establish[ed] a permissible division of responsibil-
ity between the executive and legislative branches without domi-
nation of one by the other. ' '146
In 1981, the New Hampshire Supreme Court was again
separation of powers:
In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall
never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: the execu-
tive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them:
the juducial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either
of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.
MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 30.
140. Opinion of the Justices, 96 N.H. 517, 83 A.2d 738 (1950).
141. Id. at 520, 83 A.2d at 740.
142. Id. at 521, 83 A.2d at 741.
143. Id. at 522, 83 A.2d at 741.
144. Id.
145. Opinion of the Justices, 110 N.H. 359, 266 A.2d 823 (1970).
146. Id. at 365, 266 A.2d at 827.
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faced with a legislative veto question.147 A statute requiring that
rules be approved by standing oversight committees of both
houses before becoming effective was challenged as unconstitu-
tional. The court held the statute unconstitutional, concluding
that the legislature could "not delegate its lawmaking authority
to a smaller legislative body and thereby waive the requirements
for action by a majority of a quorum of both legislative
bodies. ' '
148
In State v. A.L.LV.E. Voluntary, 49 the Alaska Supreme
Court held invalid a statute allowing the legislature, by concur-
rent resolution of both houses, to annul an agency or depart-
ment regulation.1 50 The opinion emphasized the safeguards
found in the state constitution concerning passage and effective-
ness of legislation, particularly presentation to the Governor for
approval or veto. 151 Under the Alaska Constitution, "when the
legislature wishes to act in an advisory capacity it may act by
resolution. However, when it means to take action having a
binding effect on those outside the legislature it may do so only
by following the enactment procedures.1 52 The court noted
that, although the legislature "can delegate legislative power to
others,. . . it [cannot] delegate the same power to itself and, in
the process, escape from the constraints under which it must op-
erate. ' 153 To convey the power to its own members would violate
the dual office-holding prohibition of the state constitution.1 " In
an alternative holding, the court found that since the state con-
stitution provided for two specific legislative veto procedures, 155
there was no implied power to veto agency regulations.
In 1981, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in
147. Opinion of the Justices, 121 N.H. 552, 431 A.2d 783 (1981).
148. Id. at 560, 431 A.2d at 788.
149. 606 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1980).
150. Id. at 770.
151. Id. at 772-73.
152. Id. at 773.
153. Id. at 777.
154. Id.
155. The two provisions of the constitution are (1) the governor may make changes
in the law by executive order unless his proposed changes are disapproved by the legisla-
ture within sixty days by "resolution concurred in by a majority of the members in joint
session," ALAsKA CONsT. art. III, § 23; and (2) the state local boundary commission may
make recommendations to the legislature which become effective in forty-five days un-
less vetoed by a "resolution concurred in by majority of the members of each house." Id.
at art X, § 12.
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State ex rel. Barker v. Manchin, 1 5 considered that state's gen-
eral oversight statute and found it unconstitutional. In
Manchin, the Department of Mines developed rules governing
safety of surface mine employees. A joint legislative committee
disapproved these rules. The legislature's subsequent failure to
act on the disapproval constituted approval of the committee's
action. 1 7 Barker, who was employed as a surface miner, sought a
writ of mandamus under the original jurisdiction of the court to
compel the Secretary of State to file the rules in the permanent
register.58 The court found that the legislative oversight scheme
reversed "the constitutional concept of government whereby the
Legislature enacts the law subject to the approval or the veto of
the Governor."1 9 The court reasoned that when the matter is
properly the subject of the enactment process, the legislature
cannot give the matter the force of law by a resolution. 6 0 The
legislature can amend a rule or regulation through the constitu-
tional process, but "[ilt cannot invest itself with the power to act
as an administrative agency in order to avoid these require-
ments." "6 The court concluded by holding that the portion of
the oversight statute allowing the veto violated the separation of
powers doctrine embodied in the state constitution. 
1 2
III. LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT IN SOUTH CAROLINA
A. Oversight Procedure
Prior to 1976, South Carolina required that official rules and
regulations of state agencies adopted under general and perma-
nent law be certified by the promulgating officer or agency for
substance. The rules and regulations were then reviewed by the
156. 279 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1981).
157. Under the West Virginia Code, to be effective a rule or regulation had to be
presented to the joint legislative committee, which had six months to approve or disap-
prove the rule or regulation. If the committee took no action and the legislature did not,
by concurrent resolution, reverse the committee, the rule went into effect. If the commit-
tee approved or disapproved the rule, the rule retained that status unless reversed by the
legislature. W. VA. CoDE §§ 29A-3-11 to -12 (1980).
158. 279 S.E.2d at 625.
159. 279 S.E.2d at 632 (citing Boyers v. Crane, 1 W. Va. 176 (1865)).
160. Id. at 633.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 636.
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Code Commissioner for form and filed in the office of the Secre-
tary of State.163 There was no legislative review.
In 1976 the South Carolina General Assembly enacted the
State Administrative Procedure Act (South Carolina APA). 1"
This Act was completely revised and reenacted on June 13,
1977.165 The resulting Act is similar to the Model State Adminis-
trative Procedure Act 66 and the Federal Administrative Proce-
dure Act (Federal APA). e7 The major difference is South Caro-
lina's method of legislative review,168 which was revised in part
in 1979 l69 and again in 1980.110
The Act's review procedure is complex and can best be illus-
trated by following a hypothetical regulation through the review
process. 17 1 It will be assumed that an agency has developed two
regulations and has complied with section 1-23-110 of the South
Carolina Code covering notice and comment procedures. 72
163. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1-210 (1976), repealed by No. 176, art. I, § 2, 1977 S.C.
Acts 391.
164. No. 671, 1976 S.C. Acts 1758 (repealed 1977).
165. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-23-10 to -400 (Supp. 1982). Article III, § 2 of the 1977 Act
repealed No. 671 of 1976. For a discussion of the entire Act see Note, South Carolina
Administrative Procedure Act, 30 S.C.L. REv. 1 (1979).
166. See supra note 2.
167. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 to 559 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
168. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-23-100 to -140 (Supp. 1982).
169. No. 188, 1979 S.C. Acts, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-23-120 to -125 (Supp. 1982).
170. No. 442, 1980 S.C. Acts, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-23-120 to -140 (Supp. 1980).
In 1980, South Carolina agencies proposed 138 regulations and the legislature con-
sidered 126 regulations. (The remaining twelve were carried over to 1981). Of the 126
regulations considered, 75 became effective by nonaction or expiration of the 120-day
period; 30 were required by federal law and were not subject to legislative approval; and
eleven were approved by joint resolution. Sixty-nine emergency regulations were promul-
gated. 4 S.C. State Reg. (1980). Approval by the General Assembly is not necessary for
regulations required by federal law, or for regulations developed by the State Board of
Financial Institutions. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-120 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
171. Under the S.C. APA, "agency" includes "each state board, commission, depart-
ment, executive department or officer, other than the legislature or the courts, author-
ized by the law to make regulations or to determine contested cases." S.C. CODE ANN. §
1-23-10 (Supp. 1981). Although an executive department or officer is considered an
"agency," executive orders, proclamations, or documents issued by the Governor's office
are exempt from the S.C. APA. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-100 (Supp. 1981).
172. The notice and comment procedures require the agency to give at least thirty
days notice of intended action (including promulgation of a new regulation, and amend-
ment or repeal of regulations) in the State Register. The notice must include statutory
authority, text or synoposis of the regulation, and the time and place where interested
persons may present their views. The procedures require the agency to mall notice to
persons who have made timely requests for advance notice of proposed regulations. All
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Before the regulations can take effect, the agency must sub-
mit them to the General Assembly, which has 120 days to review
them. The review period begins on the date the regulations are
filed with the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House
of Representatives. The agency must file the regulations with a
request for review and a brief synopsis or analysis of the regula-
tions. If the new regulations change existing regulations, the sy-
nopsis or analysis must show the changes. 73
After filing, the President and Speaker submit the regula-
tions to the appropriate standing committees of the Senate and
House. If neither House nor Senate committees introduce a res-
olution to approve or disapprove the regulations, they become
effective upon expiration of the 120-day period and publication
in the State Register. Should one of the reviewing committees
submit a resolution disapproving either or both of the regula-
tions when less than 60 days' remain in the 120-day review pe-
riod, the remaining period is increased to 60 days. The introduc-
tion of a resolution by a committee of either house does not
prevent the introduction of a resolution by the other house to
approve or disapprove the regulation."
If a sine die adjournment of the General Assembly occurs
within thirty days after regulations are submitted, the 120-day
period is tolled. When the General Assembly reconvenes, the re-
interested persons may submit data, views, or arguments. If twenty-five persons, a gov-
ernmental subdivision or agency, or an association having not less than twenty-five mem-
bers requests an oral hearing, the agency must grant one. The agency must consider all
written and oral comments on the proposed regulation; however, the agency is not re-
quired to base the final regulation solely on the comments. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-110
(Supp. 1981).
173. No. 414, 1982 S.C. Acts 2461-62. Prior to 1982, the review period was ninety
days. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-120 (Supp. 1981). Upon receipt, the Lieutenant Governor
and Speaker of the House have the regulation delivered to the Legislative Council for
initial processing. The Council places the regulations in Senate and House regulation
covers and enters on the cover the following information:
[T]he name of the promulgating agency, the chapter number assigned to
the agency for codification of its regulations, the statutory authority for
promulgating such regulations, a brief title, the dates the regulations were re-
ceived by the Speaker and the Lieutenant Governor, and based on the date of
receipt the expiration of the [one-hundred-twenty-day] period which would al-
low the regulations to become effective without legislative action.
RULE 16, JOINT RULES OF SENATE AND HOUSE, reprinted in 1980 LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 161
(61st ed. 1980)[hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE MANUAL].
174. No. 414, 1982 S.C. Acts 2461.
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maining period begins to run.175 In our hypothetical, there would
be a ninety-day period remaining. Special sessions called by the
Governor are not included in the 120-day period. The regula-
tions become effective 120 days after they are submitted, unless
they are adopted earlier or disapproved.117
A member of the legislature may introduce a joint resolu-
tion to approve regulations. However, he must wait until thirty
days after the regulations have been submitted to the commit-
tees. He may then introduce the joint resolution only if the com-
mittees have not introduced a joint resolution for approval or
disapproval. Action by a legislator does not toll the 120-day au-
tomatic approval period.17
7
If the House or Senate committee members object to both
hypothetical regulations, the committee is precluded from
amending them and then introducing a joint resolution approv-
ing the amended regulations. The committee may, however, sub-
mit a joint resolution approving or disapproving one or more
regulations submitted in a group of regulations, or a portion of a
single regulation that is clearly separable.17 8 In the hypothetical,
the committee may decide only one of the regulations should be
approved. To approve the acceptable regulation, the committee
would either submit a joint resolution for approval or allow ap-
proval by permitting the 120-day period to expire. To disap-
prove the unacceptable regulation, the committee would submit
a joint resolution for its rejection. If the committee decides it
cannot approve either regulation as submitted, it may then no-
tify the promulgating agency in writing and inform it what por-
tions would be acceptable. If this action is taken, the agency has
three alternatives. It may (1) withdraw the regulations from the
committee and resubmit them in amended form to the Senate
and House, (2) permanently withdraw the regulations, or (3) do
nothing and abide by whatever action is taken by the General
Assembly. These alternatives will now be considered in more
detail.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 2461-62.
178. No. 414, 1982 S.C. Acts 2462.
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1. Agency Withdraws the Regulations and Resubmits with
Recommended Changes
If the agency decides it will temporarily withdraw the regu-
lations and resubmit them with the recommended changes, the
withdrawal automatically tolls the 120-day review period. When
the revised versions of the regulations are resubmitted, the Gen-
eral Assembly will have the balance of the 120-day period to ap-
prove or disapprove them. Should the agency fail to withdraw
the original regulations within ten calendar days, or if fewer
than ten days remain in the 120-day period and the agency fails
to withdraw them within one half of this period, the agency ac-
tion is considered a refusal to withdraw. 17 9 If the regulations as
passed are substantially different from the original regulations
proposed and published in the State Register, the agency must
reinitiate the entire process unless the substantive changes were
raised, considered, or discussed by public comment, as required
by section 1-23-110 of the South Carolina Code.180
2. Agency Permanently Withdraws the Regulations
The agency may decide that if the regulations are left with
the committee they will be disapproved by joint resolution. It
may, therefore, choose to permanently withdraw the regulations.
The ability to permanently withdraw regulations allows the
agency to avoid an unwanted confrontation. Changed circum-
stances may also make permanent withdrawal necessary.
3. Agency Decides To Do Nothing and Abide by the Action
of the General Assembly
If an agency is notified by the committee that its regulations
are not acceptable in their present form, the agency may decide
to do nothing and abide by whatever action is taken by the legis-
lature. If this course is chosen, the 120-day period is automati-
cally extended to 150 days while the General Assembly is in ses-
sion. This time period must expire before the regulations are
179. Id. at 2463.
180. Id.
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effective without General Assembly approval. '
The South Carolina oversight procedure is complicated and
time consuming. However, the procedure allows an agency to
adopt an emergency regulation without going through the above-
described procedure. If the agency decides that it wants the
emergency regulation to become permanent, it must comply
with the normal method of promulgation.82
B. Inefficiency of South Carolina's Legislative Oversight
Procedure
1. Delay
The first and most obvious problem with the legislative
oversight procedure discussed above is the time required to im-
plement agency policy. An agency must initially comply with the
notice and comment procedures, which require a thirty-day no-
tice of intended action. It must then allow adequate time for re-
plies and, if necessary, an oral hearing.183 After this procedure,
the agency must comply with the oversight requirements which
add further delays. The minimum delay is 120 days unless the
regulation is approved by a joint resolution."" The agency may
adopt emergency regulations, but these are normally limited in
duration to ninety days. 8 5
181. Id. In 1980, the legislature added a provision which allows an interested person
to petition an agency in writing to promulgate, amend, or repeal a regulation. Within
thirty days of submission of the petition, the agency must either deny the petition in
writing stating the reasons for denial, or initiate the action requested in the petition. The
agency must take the required action within thirty days; however, if it should fail to do
either and simply ignore the petition, the statute provides no guidance for the petitioner
as to what further action he could take, or what sanctions, if any, can be imposed on the
agency. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-126 (Supp. 1981).
182. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-130 (Supp. 1980). Although the legislative oversight pro-
cedure provided in the South Carolina APA is the primary source of legislative oversight
in the state, the legislature has employed the concept through specific enabling statutes,
some of which have been held unconstitutional. See McLeod v. McInnis, No. 21787, slip
op. (S.C. Aug. 31, 1982)(act permitting legislative committees to control distribution of
funds held an unconstitutional infringement on the executive branch of government);
Reith v. S.C. State Hous. Auth., 267 S.C. 1, 225 S.E.2d 847 (1976)(act requiring approval
of Housing Authority regulations by General Assembly held unconstitutional).
183. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-110 (Supp. 1981).
184. See supra notes 171-82 and accompanying text.
185. An Attorney General's opinion issued February 19, 1982 states that an emer-
gency regulation promulgated pursuant to section 1-23-130 shall remain in effect for a 90
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Delay is a serious problem, and at the federal level Congress
and the courts have imposed deadlines.""8 A critical situation
arises when the legislature and the agency cannot agree upon an
acceptable regulation. The agency can either concede to the leg-
islative demands1 87 or, if so empowered, use adjudication rather
than rulemaking. This results in even further delays and is an
inefficient method of establishing agency policy.
1 88
2. Notice and Comment Thwarted
Notice and comment procedures may be thwarted by the in-
fluence of special interest groups on the reviewing committees in
the General Assembly. Notice and comment procedures are in-
cluded in the regulation-making process to insure that all inter-
ested parties have an opportunity to present their views on pro-
posed regulations. The importance of these procedures is
decreased in South Carolina because regulations are submitted
to a legislative committee for review after notice and comment.
Allowing this additional step could destroy the openness of regu-
lation-making and prevent equal access to the review process.
Many parties are financially unable to both support participa-
tion in the notice and comment procedures and finance lobbying
efforts in the reviewing committees of the General Assembly.
C. Constitutional Analysis of the South Carolina Legislative
Oversight Procedures
1. Constitutional Foundation
The South Carolina Constitution provides that legislative
power is vested in the Senate and House of Representatives of
the General Assembly.189 Supreme executive power is vested in
day period only, and may be renewed or repromulgated. Opinion of Ass't Att'y General
C. Havird Jones, in letter to Thomas S. Linton (Feb. 19, 1982).
186. See, e.g., Energy Policy and Conservation Act § 551, 42 U.S.C. § 6421 (1976).
See Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulations: A Study of
Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1369, 1379-80 (1977).
187. At this point in the process, the agency would be dealing with a standing com-
mittee of the General Assembly. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
188. See Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 186, at 1380.
189. S.C. CoNsT. art. III, § 1.
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the Governor, 190 and judicial power "in a unified judicial system
which shall include a Supreme Court, a Circuit Court, and such
other courts of uniform jurisdiction as may be provided for by
general law."'' The legislature, by constitutional mandate, cre-
ates agencies to function in areas of public concern and deter-
mines the activities, powers, and duties of the agencies. 92 All
state officers, agencies, and institutions within the Executive
Branch 93 are required to report to the Governor and to provide
him, at his request, with information relating to their respective
duties. 9 4 The Governor is charged with responsibility for insur-
ing that the laws are faithfully executed. 95
It is well settled in South Carolina that the legislature can-
not delegate its power to make laws, but it may enact a law (i.e.,
an enabling statute) authorizing an "agency or board 'to fill up
the details' by prescribing rules and regulations for complete op-
eration and enforcement of the law within its expressed general
purpose."196 This does not violate the separation of powers doc-
trine. 97 The enabling statute should declare a legislative policy
and provide primary standards for carrying it out, or establish
an intelligible principle to which the agency must conform. 9 8
The amount of authority that may be lawfully delegated de-
pends on the circumstances. The legislative policy declared by
the enabling statute and the nature of the agency's field of oper-
ation must be considered. 199 When the agency has adopted a reg-
ulation pursuant to its enabling statute, the regulation has the
190. Id. at art. IV, § 1.
191. Id. at art. V, § 1.
192. Id. at art. XII, § 1. The South Carolina Constitution lists health, welfare, safety
of the lives and property of the people, and conservation of the state's natural resources
as matters of public concern. Id.
193. The executive branch in South Carolina includes the Governor, Lieutenant
Governor, Secretary of State, State Treasurer, Attorney General, Solicitors, Adjutant
General, Comptroller General, State Superintendent of Education, Commissioner of Ag-
riculture, and the Chief Insurance Commissioner. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1-110 (1976).
194. S.C. CONsT. art. IV, § 17.
195. Id. at § 15.
196. State v. Brown, 274 S.C. 592, 266 S.E.2d 415 (1980); Terry v. Pratt, 258 S.C.
177, 187 S.E.2d 884 (1972); Cole v. Manning, 240 S.C. 260, 125 S.E.2d 621 (1962); Hey-
ward v. S.C. Tax Commission, 240 S.C. 347, 355, 126 S.E.2d 15, 19-20 (1962).
197. Cole v. Manning, 240 S.C. 260, 264, 125 S.E.2d 621, 623 (1962).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 265, 125 S.E.2d at 623.
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force of law and becomes an integral part of the statute.00
2. Separation of Powers
The General Assembly avoids violating this constitutional
provision by submitting joint resolutions approving or disap-
proving regulations to the Governor for his approval or veto.2 01
Although submission of the joint resolution to the Governor is
not required by the oversight statute, it is required by article rV,
section 21 of the South Carolina Constitution. Since a regulation
has the force of law and becomes an integral part of the enabling
statute, the General Assembly must approve or disapprove the
regulation prior to the expiration of the 120-day review period
through normal law-making procedures. The statute requires ap-
proval or disapproval by joint resolution.202 In South Carolina, a
joint resolution, once approved by the Governor, has the same
force as an act, but is a temporary measure and dies when the
subject matter is completed.20 If the joint resolution is not
presented to the Governor, it does not have the effect of law. A
joint resolution that has not been submitted to the Governor is
only one step above a concurrent resolution and only reflects the
agreement of the two houses. In State ex rel. Lyon v. Columbia
Water Power Co.,204 the South Carolina Supreme Court held
that a concurrent resolution cannot repeal a statutory provi-
200. Faile v. S.C. Employment Sec. Comm., 267 S.C. 536, 537, 230 S.E.2d 219, 220
(1976). The court noted the difference between a legislative rule which has the force of
law, and an interpretative rule which is entitled to great respect but is not binding on
the courts. Id. at 539-40, 230 S.E.2d at 221. The courts take judicial notice of regulations.
Jones v. Anderson Cotton Mills, 205 S.C. 247, 254, 31 S.E.2d 447, 449 (1944).
201. See infra note 222 and accompanying text. The separation of powers clause of
the constitution provides that "[iun the government of this State, the legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial powers of the government shall be forever separate and distinct from
each other, and no person or persons exercising the functions of one of said departments
shall assume or discharge the duties of any other." S.C. CONST. art. I, § 8.
202. No. 414, 1982 S.C. Acts 2460.
203. The South Carolina Constitution states that a bill or joint resolution shall not
have the force of law unless it has been read three times on "three several days" in each
house, the Great Seal has been affixed to it, and it has been signed by the President of
the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives. S.C. CONST. art. III, § 18.
Before the bill can become law, it must be presented to the Governor for his approval or
veto. If the Governor vetoes the bill or joint resolution, the General Assembly may over-
ride his veto by a two-thirds vote in both houses. Id. at art. IV, § 21. LEGISLATIVE MAN-
UAL, supra note 173, at 154.
204. 90 S.C. 568, 74 S.E. 26 (1912).
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sion.105 It follows that a joint resolution approving or disapprov-
ing a regulation must be submitted to the Governor for approval
or disapproval in order to have the force of law.
If a committee submits a joint resolution disapproving a
regulation, and that resolution is approved by the General As-
sembly, the regulation is rejected unless the Governor vetoes the
joint resolution.- Of course, the General Assembly has the final
vote and may override the Governor's veto. Thus, by complying
with constitutional mandates, a separation of powers violation is
avoided.
3. Review Period
The portion of South Carolina's oversight statute requiring
a 120-day review period before a regulation is passed appears
constitutionally valid.20 6 This review period allows the General
Assembly time to review the regulation and determine whether
it complies with the scheme of the enabling statute. If nothing
happens and the regulation is approved at the expiration of the
120-day period, the only harm is the delay in placing the regula-
tion into effect. This portion of the procedure is similar to the
procedure upheld at the federal level in Sibbach.0 7
4. Dual Office Holding P:ovision of the South Carolina
Constitution
Article III, section 24 of the South Carolina Constitution
provides that a member of the General Assembly cannot hold
any other office of profit or trust under the state. A reviewing
committee apparently has de facto power to veto regulations, be-
cause if the committee disapproves a regulation, it is difficult, if
not impossible, to obtain approval of the regulation by the legis-
205. A concurrent resolution affects the actions of the General Assembly and is used
to record the agreement of the two Houses. LEGISLATIVE MANUAL, supra note 173, at 155.
Like the legislative oversight requirements for agencies, the supreme court is required to
submit court rules that it has promulgated under section 14-3-950 of the South Carolina
Code to the legislature. The rules or amendments become effective within 90 days unless
disapproved by concurrent resolution. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-3-950 (Supp. 1981).
206. No. 414, 1982 S.C. Acts 2460.
207. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
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lature as a whole. 208 Therefore, committee members may be act-
ing in both administrative and legislative capacities in violation
of the dual office holding provision of the constitution.
20 9
In Cole v. Manning210 the South Carolina Supreme Court
concluded that "the power delegated. . . is. . . not legislative,
but administrative .... [T]he courts may not substitute judicial
discretion for administrative discretion, and therefore as a gen-
eral rule will not attempt to interfere with the exercise of discre-
tionary power by a governmental agency. . . ."11 It follows that
although the legislature has the power to establish and abolish
agencies, it cannot substitute its legislative discretion for admin-
istrative discretion.1 2 Of course, the agencies' regulations must
conform to their enabling statutes. Whether a regulation con-
forms to its enabling statute is a question for the courts to de-
cide, not the legislature. The Cole court stated that "capricious
or arbitrary exercise of administrative discretion is of course
subject to judicial review. "21' The court noted a difference be-
tween administrative and legislative capacities, but did not indi-
cate where the legislative function stops and the administrative
function begins.214 If the reviewing committee has the de facto
power to disapprove regulations, it is acting as an agency and its
members are violating the dual office holding provision.
208. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
209. The dual office holding provision of the South Carolina Constitution provides
that:
[n]o person shall be eligible to a seat in the General Assembly while he
holds any office or position of profit or trust under this State, the United
States of America or any of them, or under any other power, except officers in
the milita and Notaries Public; and if any member shall accept or exercise any
of the said disqualifying offices or positions he shall vacate his seat.
S.C. CONST. art. III, § 24.
210. 240 S.C. 260, 125 S.E.2d 621 (1962).
211. Id. at 267, 125 S.E.2d at 624-25.
212. The counter argument is that if the legislature can abolish the agency, why
can't it abolish the regulations?
213. 240 S.C. at 268, 125 S.E.2d at 625.
214. Id. at 267, 125 S.E.2d at 623-25.
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE
A. Adoption of the 1981 Model State APA to Improve
Procedural Efficiency
The legislature could replace the present oversight provi-
sions of the South Carolina APA with section 3-201 of the 1981
Model State APA.m This provision requires agencies to review
all of their regulations annually to determine if a new regulation
should be submitted. The agencies submit an annual report, cov-
ering the effectiveness of the regulations and any criticisms, to
an administrative rules review committee.
B. Alternative Methods of Legislative Oversight That Would
Avoid Constitutional Problems
1. Create an Agency To Review All Regulations Promulgated
by Other Agencies
This approach is similar to California's,'" which has thus
far proved successful. The procedure would eliminate legislative
oversight. The legislature would establish guidelines in the ena-
bling statute creating the agency. An agency would then approve
or disapprove regulations based on statutory requirements. Ap-
peal of the agency's actions would be to the Governor. 17
2. Provide for Review of Rules by the Governor
This procedure is provided for in section 3-202 of the 1981
Model State APA. An administrative rules counsel is established
in the Governor's office to "advise the governor in the execution
of the authority vested under this Article." 18 The Governor, by
executive order, has the authority to suspend or rescind a rule
"to the extent the agency itself would have authority."21'
215. 1981 MODEL STATE APA, supra note 17, § 3-201.
216. See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
217. Id.
218. 1981 MODEL STATE APA, supra note 17, § 3-202(c).
219. Id. at § 3-202(a). According to the comments following § 3-202:
An authority vested in the governor of a state to veto administrative rules
avoids the separation of powers problems that legislative veto schemes raise; it
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3. Establish an Administrative Regulation Review
Committee
An administrative regulation review committee, as described
by section 3-203 of the 1981 Model State APA and the proce-
dures provided for it by section 3-204, eliminates most, if not all,
of the practical and constitutional problems. The review com-
mittee is within the legislature and reviews proposed and
adopted rules. The committee may recommend that the legisla-
ture supersede a particular rule by statute. Any other committee
of the legislature may also review a rule or recommend that the
rule be superseded. 220 The committee may fie an objection with
a statement of its reasons with the Secretary of State if it finds
that the rule exceeds "the procedural or substantive authority
delegated to the adopting agency. '221 The agency receives a copy
of the objection which is published in the state register adjacent
to the regulation.222 Within fourteen days after the objection is
filed, the agency must respond in writing, after which the com-
mittee may withdraw or change its objection. 23 If the regulation
is not withdrawn, it remains in effect; however, in a judicial pro-
ceeding the burden is on the agency to establish that the regula-
tion is "within the procedural and substantive authority dele-
gated to the agency.
'224
Section 3-204 of the 1981 Model State APA allows objec-
tions based upon "lawfulness" of the rule, or, whether the
agency has exceeded its statutory authority. Therefore, obliga-
tions based on policy would be insufficient.2 5 This section of the
1981 Model State APA provides a realistic legislative check on
agency rules without impinging on the powers of the executive.
avoids the subversion of the governor's authority to veto legislative acts that is
inherent in legislative veto schemes; and it keeps effective political and admin-
istrative control of all law enforcement in the official who is, by the state con-
stitution, the chief executive, and who is directly politically accountable to the
people for proper performance of that function.
1981 MODEL STATE APA § 3-202, comments.
220. Id. at § 3-204(c).
221. Id. at § 3-204(d)(1).
222. Id. at § 3-204(d)(2)-(3).
223. Id. at § 3-204(d)(4).
224. Id. at § 3-204(d)(5).
225. See IOWA CODE § 17A.4(4)(a)(Supp. 1981).
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V. CONCLUSION
Agencies have been characterized as a headless "fourth
branch" of the government, and there has been a growing con-
cern that agencies are not sufficiently responsible to the execu-
tive or legislative branches of the government or to the electo-
rate for their functions.22'6 Because of the increase in the number
of agencies and the corresponding growth in the number of rules
and regulations, legislatures have sought more effective means of
supervising agency activities. The most controversial legislative
oversight schemes are those giving legislative committees the
power to veto a regulation,2 and those utilizing the legislature
to disapprove the regulation by joint or concurrent resolution.2 2 8
Alaska and West Virginia have held these forms of legislative
oversight unconstitutional under dual office holding and separa-
tion of powers provisions of their constitutions.22 9
Serious practical problems are created by the South Caro-
lina legislative oversight procedure. The procedure causes con-
siderable delay in the promulgation of regulations, and because
of the de facto power held by the legislative reviewing commit-
tees to pressure agencies to promulgate regulations to conform
to the committees' demands, the notice and comment proce-
dures may become a hollow shell. The final decision on the
adoption of a regulation will not rest with the agency, but with
the committee.30
To avoid practical and constitutional problems, the General
Assembly should consider amending the South Carolina APA or
establishing a different procedure. If the legislature decides to
continue legislative oversight of regulations, it should adopt sec-
tions 3-203 and 3-204 of the 1981 Model State APA. This ap-
proach is the most practical alternative and the least questiona-
ble on constitutional grounds.
Ronald A. Herring
226. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 353.
227. State ex rel. Baker v. Manchin, 279 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1981).
228. State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1980).
229. See supra notes 149-62 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 183-88 and accompanying text.
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